The rise of supercenters and the entry of Wal-Mart into food retailing have dramatically altered the competitive environment in the industry. This paper explores the impact of such changes on the labor market practices of traditional food retailers. We use longitudinal data on workers and firms to construct new measures of compensation and employment, and examine how these measures evolve within and across firms in response to changes in product market competition. An additional feature of the analysis is to combine rich case study knowledge about the retail food industry with the new matched employer-employee data from the Census Bureau. We compare a set of human resource practices using measures based on the matched employer-employee data to an index based on survey data and case studies. The consistency between the two approaches suggests that the measures are capturing important differences in supermarket human resource practices and policies. Analysis of administrative data combined with case study observations strengthens our understanding of the diversity of human resource practices in the retail food industry.
Introduction
In recent years, much public concern has been raised about whether industrial restructuring has resulted in the creation of more "bad jobs" in the U.S. Critics have argued that employers have changed long-standing practices regarding the terms of employment and the way wages are set. The fear is that there are fewer jobs that offer a traditional long-term employment relationship and, at the same time, there are more low-skilled jobs with high rates of turnover and little opportunity for training and wage advancement. And some empirical evidence suggests that for workers with less education and few skills, the opportunities for advancement through job ladders are dwindling (Bernhardt et al., 2001 ).
The objective of this paper is to use a new, very detailed, dataset to examine the impact of restructuring on human resource practices in the retail food industry.
The retail food industry is, in many ways, an ideal industry for such a study.
Although the retail sector of the economy has always had a relatively flat job hierarchy, supermarket jobs were once among the most highly paid and highly coveted retail jobs.
However, over time, this feature of the industry has changed, and the typical supermarket job is no longer a full-time, relatively well paid position (often unionized), but rather a part-time job with irregular hours, low pay, and limited options for training or promotion.
This has occurred at the same time that the industry has undergone massive product market restructuring, as Wal-Mart and other mass merchandisers have entered the industry. Indeed, Wal-Mart is now the largest food retailer in the U.S. with its share of the grocery market estimated to be close to 20%, having expanded from only ten supercenters in 1993 to over 1,866 supercenters by 2005.
In this paper we directly examine the relationship between growing competition from mass merchandisers like Wal-Mart and changes in human resources practices within the industry. While case study evidence suggests that the proliferation of big box stores has had a substantial impact on the labor market, most empirical studies to date have focused on the changes in county-level employment and wages that occur after Wal-Mart entry (for example, Basker, 2005 and Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella, 2005) . There has been no large scale dataset available on both firms and workers that could be used to describe human resource practices at the firm level. In this study we exploit a new dataset that permits us to analyze changes in supermarket hiring, promotion, pay and turnover policies at the establishment level in response to entry of mass merchandisers in the local market. We particularly focus on the role of firm entry and exit, since such policies have been linked to firm performance and survival (Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer, 2006) .
Background and Motivation
Measurement of shifts in human resource practices of food retailers in response to changing product market competition is a challenge. Some guidance is provided by Lazear and Oyer (2004) , who use measures of promotion, hiring, and wage setting to capture key aspects of human resource practices -which they (and we) refer to as internal labor markets (ILMs). The ILM concept provides a useful construct in which to frame the analysis.
ILMs are generally characterized by long-term employment relationships, with most hiring done from within the firm for positions other than low-level "port-of entry" jobs. In firms with ILMs, wages are related to job characteristics and are relatively unresponsive to changes in the external labor market. Evidence supporting (though not proving) the existence of ILMs includes the persistence of firm wage differentials over time, the extent of upward mobility and returns to seniority within firms, and limited external hiring other than at ports of entry. As described by Groshen and Levine (1998) , numerous theories have been developed to explain why firms create internal labor markets. These models focus on the importance of firm-specific human capital, incentives and risk sharing as possible motivations. Lazear and Oyer (2004) identify "ex post fluidity" as a key feature of internal labor markets where workers make decisions on employment and firms follow by adjusting internal human resource practices and organizational structure. The critical element is that firms adjust human resource practices and may change their ILM status in response to competitive conditions. Fairris (2004) suggests that firms choose their ILM status and these choices influence workforce quality at the firm, including the quit rate.
While food stores are generally not known for innovative or high-performance human resources practices (Ben-Ner, Kong and Bosley, 1999) , there is some case study evidence of variation in human resource practices across firms in this industry. In 2006, for example, Fortune magazine's list of the top 100 companies to work for included several supermarket chains, with Wegmans Food Markets and Whole Foods Markets ranked in the top twenty.
For some firms facing increased product market competition, customer service is seen as an important competitive edge, and long-term employment relationships may improve productivity and support the development of ILMs. Some food retailers have expanded the range of specialized services they offer, including more labor-and training-intensive services such as bakeries, delis, prepared food items and other services (Warner 2005) . The historical high rate of unionization in supermarkets (relative to other types of retail) also suggests the existence of ILMs in parts of the industry. Thus, the limited evidence available suggests that there is heterogeneity in the wage and ILM structure in the retail food industry, and that individual firms may respond only sluggishly to changes in the external market.
Data and measurement
The data used in this study are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) database that matches workers with employers.
This database includes quarterly records of the earnings of almost all individuals from the unemployment insurance systems of most U.S. states starting in the 1990s. This study uses a subset of seven states (California, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon and Washington) that have sufficient years of longitudinal data. These data have been extensively described elsewhere (e.g., Abowd et al., 2005) . 
Internal labor markets and human resource practices in supermarkets
Following Lazear and Oyer (2004) , we employ measures of promotion, hiring, and wage setting in order to capture key aspects of human resource practices of supermarkets. For promotion practices, we measure the proportion of workers hired into the second quintile that move to a higher quintile in five years and the wage growth of workers starting in the second quintile over the five-year time span.
1 Hiring patterns are captured by the churning rates 2 of all full-quarter workers in the establishment as well as by the proportion of accessions in the fifth and fourth earnings quintile within the firm.
The pattern of wage setting is captured by the mean and standard deviation of log real 1 Much of the supermarket workforce is part-time and transitional by choice, with a smaller percentage of career retail food workers appearing in the data. We address this issue by focusing on full quarter workers, as well as examining the promotion and wage growth of workers who have earnings that are in the second and higher quintiles of the firm wage distribution, rather than the bottom quintile. The sample includes all establishments classified as grocery stores (SIC 54111) that have at least 15 full-quarter workers and 30 flow workers. Flow employment accounts for all workers employed by the firm at any time during the quarter, while full quarter employment measures all workers who were employed on either a part time or full time basis by the employer for the full quarter. The earnings measures reflect quarterly earnings without any adjustment for the number of hours worked during the quarter. There is no information on hours or weeks worked or the duration of employment within the quarter in the database. 2 Churning is defined as accessions plus separations minus net job flows divided by employment.
earnings for full quarter workers in the firm, as well as by measures of earnings dispersion for full quarter workers.
Given the high correlation of these measures across establishment (with the exception of worker wage growth) we employ cluster analysis to classify the supermarkets into one of two groups, which for convenience we call ILM and non-ILM.
The clustering strategy uses non-hierarchical clustering based upon the median value of the measures in each of the groups. The measures capture hiring, wage setting, and promotion practices and include measures of worker churning, mean earnings, the standard deviation of earnings, and the ratio of flow to full quarter workers. The clustering is done on pooled 1997 and 2002 data. To create the index, each store was ranked as to whether it was above or below the mean (calculated from the survey data) for each of the five measures. If the store was above the mean on at least three of the measures, it was coded as a high HR store. About one-third of the stores in the Supermarket Panel survey were ranked "high" according to 3 There are nine indicators of incentive based and non-cash compensation in the survey, including the issuance of annual bonuses, individual performance incentive pay, incentive pay based on product or category performance, an employee stock ownership plan, individual health insurance, family health insurance, disability insurance, a company funded pension plan, and a 401(k) plan. From the survey, we count the number of indicators that are typically part of the compensation of both full-time personnel and part-time personnel. This is consistent with the definition of an ILM in which benefits accrue to jobs and not individuals within the firm.
this index. Using this index as a guide, we then categorized major supermarket chains into three groups: those at the high end of the HR scale, those at the low end, and those that exhibited a high range of variability from one store location to another. While there was a degree of subjectivity in this categorization, use of case study and industry knowledge helped to inform the process. the Supermarket survey were identified as being ILM firms using the cluster analysis.
Close to 60% of those firms marked as having low HR practices were designated as non-ILM firms based on the cluster analysis. These results increase our confidence that the LEHD measures of ILMs are capturing important differences in store HR policies and practices.
Supermarket Response to Competition from Mass Merchandisers
Faced with growing competition from non-traditional food sellers, supermarkets have typically responded with changes in marketing and pricing, yet they may also alter employment and compensation strategies in an effort to adapt. In this section we analyze the impact of competition from mass merchandisers on two outcomes: the likelihood of firm exit and the probability of changing HR practices (from ILM to non-ILM or vice versa). While both ILM and non-ILM firms are more likely to exit the industry than change human resource practices, non-ILM firms pursue an exit rather than change strategy at a much higher rate than ILM firms -and this is particularly true in high threat areas. In high threat areas, non-ILM firms are more than four times more likely to exit than change while ILM firms are just over twice as likely to record this outcome. In low threat areas, by contrast, non-ILM firms are still more than four times likely to exit than change while ILM firms are 1.5 times as likely to record this outcome. Given that an establishment does survive, the propensity to maintain the same HR policy over time is about the same for both ILM firms and non-ILM firms (near 80%).
Empirical analysis and findings
Human resource practices observed in the retail food industry show a significant amount of heterogeneity, though these practices also exhibit a large amount of persistence over time. In this section, we more closely examine the ways in which the labor market structure of the industry can change through establishments' differential reactions to the changing competition while controlling for a variety of establishment specific factors. We first examine the effect of changing competitive conditions on firm exit using a probit model for the probability that an establishment observed in 1997 exits by 2002. The key independent variables are the number of mass merchandisers within a five-mile radius (measured in 1997) -which is the measure of competitive threat -and a dummy for whether the firm uses ILM human resource practices. Thus we can compare the impacts of mass merchandisers on grocery store exit and the differential effect of mass merchandisers on ILM versus non-ILM grocery store establishments. Variables that control for other aspects of the competitiveness and size of the local product market include the 1997 four-firm concentration ratio of grocery stores, 1997 county per capita income, and 1997 county population. Establishment-level control variables include firm size and workforce composition (age, sex, education and citizenship). Table 3 presents the marginal effects from the probit regressions for firm exit.
Focusing first on column 1, stores with greater numbers of mass merchandisers within a five-mile radius are more likely to exit while stores with ILM practices are less likely to exit. This important link between ILM structure and decreased probability of exit confirms other studies on supermarket performance. Furthermore, the large negative coefficient on ILM status is consistent with expectations, as ILM status is likely to be correlated with the age, multi-unit status, and overall economic performance of a grocery establishment. While the effect of mass merchandisers is relatively small, it is consistent with our expectations that competition from mass merchandisers adversely affects traditional grocery store survival.
The second column adds an interaction between number of mass merchandisers nearby and ILM status. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant suggesting that grocery establishments with ILMs, relative to non-ILM grocery establishments, are more adversely affected by competition from mass merchandisers.
The coefficient on mass merchandisers becomes insignificant while the coefficient on ILM status becomes larger. The size and significance of these first three coefficients remains constant as additional controls for local product market conditions and firm characteristics are added in the last two columns, despite the relatively small sample size.
The overall results from the model are particularly informative given industry discussions about how to deal with emerging competition from mass merchandisers.
Information from supermarket managers who faced early entry from mass merchandisers suggested a conservative strategy in adjusting labor practices. The Progressive Grocer noted that grocers who are "doing battle with supercenters tend to rely on tried-and-true weapons such as service and perishables" (Garry 1993) . Competitive tactics such as expanding service departments, focusing on strong customer service, and putting more emphasis on the quality of perishables were mentioned by store managers as the best methods for competing against mass merchandisers and supercenters. These strategies rely on dedicated, long-term employees who are familiar with the longtime customers and have a commitment to service and are most effectively implemented with an ILM workforce.
A second issue is to identify factors that influence changes in the internal labor structure of food retailers, restricting attention to establishments who remain in business from 1997 through 2002. This specification is restricted to food retailers identified as having an internal labor market in 1997and estimates the probability of switching from ILM to non-ILM status by 2002 using a probit model. Across all specifications presented in Table 4 , the number of mass merchandisers located in the same market area as a food retailer had no statistically discernible impact on switching behavior (similarly, the number of mass merchandisers had no statistically significant correlation with switching from non-ILM to ILM status in a separate regression not shown). Food retailers with an ILM structure were significantly less likely to switch to a non-ILM structure when operated in a region with a high concentration ratio than if it operated in a region with a low concentration ratio. A ten-percentage point increase in the CR-4 ratio is associated with a decrease in the probability of switching from ILM to non-ILM status of about four percentage points. This effect is apparent even when grocery store size is controlled for in the model, although the point estimate is reduced and statistical significance is at the 10% significance level. This result suggests that increases in the concentration ratio of grocery sales in a given region provide an insulating factor for food retailers to retain high performance human resource practices. Overall, however, the competitive presence of mass merchandisers does not appear to influence food retailers into switching either to or away from an ILM structure.
Conclusion
Technology, changing consumer preferences, and competition from nontraditional food retailers like Wal-Mart have led to major changes in supermarket operations, pricing and supply chain strategies over the past decade. Several recent empirical studies suggest that Wal-Mart's entry reduces employment and payroll in a
county, yet the way in which an industry's labor market adjusts in response to such competitive shocks is not clear. The evidence presented here suggests that there is considerable heterogeneity in human resource practices across retail food establishments, and these practices are quite persistent even in the face of new external competition.
While individual establishments do not appear to change HR strategies rapidly, the local labor market may be impacted through the entry and exit of particular firms, rather than changes in strategies of existing firms. Establishments with ILMs as a whole are less likely to exit, yet ILM establishments are more likely than non-ILM establishments to exit in areas with increased competition from mass merchandisers. Our analysis of matched employee-employer data finds that while HR practices are persistent among food retailers, local labor markets are likely to be impacted by entry of mass merchandisers through entry and exit of firms. Note: Columns one and two cluster stores based on LEHD measures. Columns 3 and 4 group stores based on external survey data on human resource practices. **Difference between ILM (high HR index) and non-ILM (low HR index) is statistically significant at the 5% level. AiNorton (2003) correction for the magnitudes and standard errors of the interaction effects. *significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include controls for change in ownership and log of county population. *significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
